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Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78A 
-4-103, as this case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-4-103(2)G). 
Issues Presented For Review 
1. Whether the trial court correctly denied the rule 60(b )( 4) motion of 
Appellants/Defendants International Confections Company, LLC, NG Acquisition, LLC, 
and Michael D. Ryan (collectively "Defendants"), seeking relief fromjudgment on the 
basis that the judgment was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This issue is 
reviewed de nova. See Migliore v. Livingston Financial, LLC, 2015 UT 9, ,i 25,347 P. 
3d 394. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly denied Defendants' rule 60(b)(6) motion 
seeking relief from judgment on the basis that the judgment was invalid due to the filing 
of a withdrawal of counsel. "A district court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion 
to set aside an order of judgment under rule 60(b), and [t]hus, we review a district court's 
denial of a 60(b) motion under an abuse of discretion standard." Crane-Jenkins v. 
Mikarose, LLC, 2015 UT App 270, ,i 9, 799 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
3. Whether the trial court correctly denied Defendants rule 60(b )( 1) motion 
seeking relief from judgment on the basis of excusable neglect. The standard of review 
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is the same as issue no. 2, above. See id.; see also Weber v. Mikarose, LLC, 2015 UT 
App 130, ,r 11, 351 P. 3d 1121. 
4. Whether this appeal is moot given the nature of this case and Defendants' 
failure to appeal from the decision below or to move to stay these proceedings. An 
appeal is moot "when an appellant has failed to obtain a stay of the judgment and the 
remedy sought is thereafter rendered impossible." Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719, 
721 (Utah 1996). Moreover, "an appeal will be dismissed as moot 'if an event 
happening after hearing and decree in circuit court, but before appeal is taken, or pending 
appeal, makes determination of the appeal unnecessary or renders it clearly impossible for 
the appellate court to grant effectual relief."' Masonry Arts, Inc. v. Mobile Co. Com 'n, 
628 So.2d 334,335 (Ala. 1993) (citation omitted) (cited with approval in Baum, 914 P.2d 
at 721). 
Statement of the Case 
Defendants' "Statement of the Case" should not be relied upon for consideration 
of this appeal. Much of this "statement" is argumentative, while Defendants insert a 
number of unsupported and incorrect assertions as "facts." See, e.g., Appellants' Br., p. 
3, ,r l; p. 6, (Arg. III); pp. 9-12 (Arg. V). Indeed, the allegations contained in pp. 9-12 
are simply taken from an unverified complaint Defendants' filed in an Ohio court, months 
after the final judgment at issue in this lawsuit was entered. The very first allegation 
contained therein (that ICC first learned of the relevant purchase agreement when it tried 
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to pursue post-receivership claims) is not only unsupported, but incorrect, as Defendants 
concede in the Ohio complaint itself and as ruled by the trial court below. See Ruling 
and Order, p. 9 (R.1459). Accordingly, Defendants' "Statement of the Case" is not 
helpful in deciding the discrete issue on appeal. 
The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred when it denied 
Defendants' motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The 
facts relevant to that decision are set forth below: 
1. On October 21, 2014, Transportation Alliance Bank Inc. ("TAB") filed a 
verified complaint (the "Complaint") commencing this action against ICC and NG 
( collectively the "Companies") and their principal, Michael D. Ryan ("Ryan"). The third 
cause of action stated in the Complaint sought appointment of a receiver under the 
parties' loan documents and under Utah R. Civ. P. 66. (See R. 1-20.) 
2. On October 24, 2014, TAB filed a motion for the immediate appointment of 
a receiver (the "Receivership Motion"). (See R. 238-41.) 
3. Defendants appeared generally in the case through their counsel, Mark F. 
James and the firm of Hatch, James & Dodge, P.C. (collectively, "James"). James filed a 
notice of appearance as counsel for all three Defendants on November 4, 2014. (See 
R.392.) James filed papers, appeared and participated in hearings, entered into binding 
stipulations on behalf of Defendants, and represented Defendants generally in this case. 
(See, e.g., R. 392, 395-96, 422-23, 429-35.) 
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4. The Court conducted an initial hearing on November 5, 2014 at which: (a) 
James participated on behalf of Defendants; (b) secured creditors appeared and moved to 
intervene as parties; ( c) counsel stipulated to allow the creditors to intervene; and ( d) the 
Court granted the Receivership Motion, appointed Mr. Kent Goates as the Receiver, and 
authorized him to begin the receivership "immediately as stated on the record." (See trial 
court docket; see also R. 395-96.) 
5. Also on November 5, 2014, the following secured creditors filed a 
Stipulated Motion for Leave to Intervene pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a): Back Bay 
Investments, L.C.; Dynamic Confections, Inc.; Wasatch Peak Holdings, L.L.C.; Bank of 
American Fork; and Arcadia Holdings, LLC (collectively, the "Intervenors"). The 
motion to intervene was stipulated to, signed and endorsed by James as counsel for the 
Defendants, and the Court entered its Order Granting Motion to Intervene (the 
"Intervention Order") that same day. (See R. 429-35.) 
6. Also on November 5, 2014, the Court entered its Interim Order Approving 
the Immediate Appointment of Receiver ("Interim Order"). (See id.) 
7. After certain objections were filed to the fonn of the Interim Order, 
including an objection by Defendants (see R. 525-26), the Court conducted a hearing on 
November 13, 2014 at which James again appeared as counsel for Defendants. The 
parties made arguments on the record and at the conclusion of the hearing the Court 
signed and entered a revised Order Approving the Immediate Appointment of Receiver 
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(the "Receivership Order") (see R.662-677). Among other things, the Receivership 
Order provided as follows: 
Receiver, as an officer of this Court, shall immediately have and take 
possession, custody, and control of the business and all of the assets of both 
Maxfield and NG (together, the "Companies") including, without 
limitation, the Collateral ( as defined in the Verified Complaint), all real 
property, improvements, leases, equipment, fixtures, rents, accounts, 
inventory, and other personal property (the "Assets"). (R.664.) 
8. On November 24, 2014, eleven days after entry of the Receivership Order, 
TAB filed a document purporting to be a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to Utah 
R. Civ. P. 4l(a)(l) (the "Notice of Dismissal") (R.720-22). However, as noted above, 
the Intervenors already had been granted permission to intervene as parties in the case 
pursuant to Rule 24(a) and the Receiver had already been appointed and charged with 
duties pursuant to Rule 66. (See R.429-35, 662-677.) 
9. On the next day, November 25, 2014, two of the Intervenors filed 
objections to the Notice of Dismissal asserting that voluntary dismissal pursuant to rule 
41 was improper at the current stage of the proceedings. (See R.726-40.) 
10. On November 26, 2014, Defendants filed a reply (the "Reply") to the 
Intervenors' objections to the Notice of Dismissal. The Reply raised arguments 
substantially similar to the subject matter jurisdiction arguments Defendants now raise 
again in the Rule 60(b) Motion, including assertions that upon TAB's filing of the Notice 
of Dismissal the entire case was automatically dismissed by operation of law and that the 
Court was "deprived of jurisdiction by operation oflaw." (See R.750-54.) 
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11. On December 3, 2014, the Court conducted a hearing on the dispute arising 
from the Notice of Dismissal, Intervenors' objections thereto, and the Reply of 
Defendants. The subject matter jurisdiction arguments raised by Defendants were 
squarely before the Court for determination. James participated in the hearing on behalf 
of Defendants. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court ruled that based on agreement 
of the parties, the Intervenors were substituted in as the plaintiffs as to the third cause of 
action in the Complaint, that all other causes of action would be dismissed, that the case 
would remain pending (notwithstanding Defendants' subject matter jurisdiction 
arguments), and that the Receiver was authorized to sell ICC's and NG's assets as stated 
on the record. (See R.1482-1495.) 
12. The Court's order memorializing its rulings made at the December 3, 2014 
hearing was entered on December 11, 2014 (the "Amended Receivership Order") 
(R.779-82). The Amended Receivership Order provided, inter alia, as follows: 
Receiver is hereby granted authority from the Court to market and 
sell the Assets, as defined in the Receivership Order, or any portion thereof, 
and, in his business judgment, to hire the appropriate professionals to assist 
with the same, but subject to (a) prior notice to all parties to this action, 
through their counsel of record, who may object to any such proposed sale, 
and (b) as to any proposed disposition as to which an objection is filed with 
the Court, further order from the Court approving Receiver's decision to 
sell the Assets or any part thereof. 
(R.781.) Defendants approved the Amended Receivership Order as to form prior to 
entry (R.782), did not appeal the Amended Receivership Order and did not seek a stay. 
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13. The Defendants were fully aware, as indicated in statements made by 
Intervenors in their filed objections to the Notice of Dismissal and by Defendants in the 
Reply, that the proposed asset purchaser (BBX) was insisting upon a very tight timeline 
for negotiating an asset purchase agreement with the Receiver and for closing on the 
proposed purchase of the Companies' assets. In fact, in Bank of American Fork's 
objection to the Notice of Dismissal, filed November 25, 2014, Bank of American Fork 
indicated that upon Court approval, the sale could take place "within a relatively short 
time, perhaps even a few weeks" from November 25, 2014. Thus, all parties in interest, 
including Defendants, would have known by no later than the time of the Court's ruling 
on December 3, 2014, that the Receiver was likely going to seek Court approval of a 
proposed sale to a specific purchaser by the middle of December. (R.726-54.) 
14. Ultimately, Mrs. Fields offered to purchase the assets for more than the 
BBX offer, and on December 17, 2014, Mrs. Fields and the Receiver concluded their 
extensive negotiations concerning the terms and conditions of Mrs. Fields' proposed 
purchase. Mrs. Fields and the Receiver executed their Asset Purchase Agreement (the 
"APA") that same day. (See R.796-933.) This was not a simple purchase of a single 
item, but included equipment and machinery, leases, perishable inventories, accounts 
receivable and intangible property. See id. 
15. On December 18, 2014, James filed a Notice of Withdrawal purporting to 
withdraw as counsel for the Defendants, but the Notice of Withdrawal failed to "include 
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the address of the attorney's client and a statement that no motion is pending and no 
hearing or trial has been set," as is required by Utah R. Civ. P. 74(a). (R.787-88.) 
Regardless, the trial court determined that "James continued to receive electronic notice 
of all pending motions and hearings as required by the rules" and that "there is no 
evidence that Defendants did not receive actual notice of' the subsequent motion, hearing 
and order (R.1459). 
16. Also on December 18, 2014, the Receiver filed papers seeking approval of 
the proposed sale to Mrs. Fields, including an Expedited Motion for Order on Sale of 
Receivership Assets and Related Issues (the "Sale Motion"), a Memorandum in Support 
of the Sale Motion, and a Notice of Hearing and Objection Deadline relating to the Sale 
Motion. These papers were served upon all counsel of record in the case, including 
James as counsel for the Defendants. (See R.792-889.) The papers clearly specified 
that "[t]he 'Assets' being sold include nearly all of the assets of Maxfield [ICC] and NG, 
including but not limited to all inventories, accounts receivable, intangible property, 
intellectual property, equipment, goodwill and going concern value." (R.797.) 
17. On December 22, 2014, the Receiver filed a proposed order granting the 
Sale Motion and approving the APA, along with exhibits that included a full copy of the 
fully executed APA (with its exhibits). The proposed order and APA were served upon 
all counsel of record in the case, including James as counsel for the Defendants. (See 
R.917-24.) 
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18. On December 23, 2014, the Court conducted a hearing as scheduled on the 
Sale Motion, received evidence and heard arguments and statements from the parties, 
made a ruling granting the Sale Motion and approving the AP A, and then signed and 
entered the proposed order at the conclusion of the hearing (the "Sale Order"). (See 
R.926-36; 1496-1519.) 
19. The Sale Order contains specific findings and conclusions, including but 
not limited to the following: (a) the APA was "the highest and best offer" received for 
the assets ofNG and ICC; and (b) Mrs. Fields "acted in good faith and at arm's length" in 
entering into the APA. (See R.926-36.) 
20. In reliance on the Sale Order, Mrs. Fields paid the $2.15 million purchase 
price, the Receiver distributed the funds to Defendants' creditors, the Receiver 
effectuated the transfer of property contemplated by the Sale Order and Mrs. Fields began 
operating the purchased assets. See Receiver's Final Report & Accounting, p. 4 (R.948). 
The receivership was closed on January 23, 2015 (R.1009-13). 
21. On March 9, 2015, ICC filed an improper complaint (the "Improper 
Complaint") against Mrs. Fields and an affiliate in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio asserting a claim that already had been sold to Mrs. Fields 
pursuant to the Sale Order. See Improper Complaint (R.1039-50). 
22. Defendants had actual knowledge, before ICC filed the Improper 
Complaint, that the sale of ICC's and NG's assets to Mrs. Fields in the receivership case 
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had been completed. See id., ,i 47 (acknowledging that "Mrs. Fields Confections 
purchased International Confections' assets in the receivership sale"). 
23. ICC then dismissed the Improper Complaint and Defendants filed their 
motion for relief from judgment in this case on March 23, 2015. (See R.1016-33.) 
Defendants, in essence, sought to keep the benefit of the $2,150,000 they received in the 
form of payoff of their debt, while avoiding the protections afforded Mrs. Fields in 
exchange for those payments. See id; see also Defs.' Reply Br. (R.1184-85). 
24. On April 6, 2015, Mrs. Fields moved to intervene in this action 
(R.1105-15), which motion was unopposed and granted on April 15, 2015 (See 
R.1205-08). 
25. Mrs. Fields filed a memorandum in opposition to Defendant's motion for 
relieffromjudgment on April 6, 2015. (See R.1125-45.) 
26. The trial court heard oral argument on Defendants' motion on July 1, 2015. 
(See R.1520-94.) 
27. The trial court issued its Ruling and Order on August 21, 2015. 
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Summary of Arguments 
Appellants fail to show any error committed by the trial court in denying 
Appellants' rule 60(b)(4) motion. Res judicata applies to bar a post-judgment challenge 
in the same proceeding pursuant to rule 60(b )( 4 ). Here, when the issue was raised below, 
the trial court determined ( and all parties agreed) it had subject matter jurisdiction. This 
decision was not appealed and cannot be attacked pursuant to a rule 60(b) motion. Further, 
even if Defendants could somehow bypass the dispositive issue of finality, they cannot 
show that the trial court's ruling was otherwise erroneous given Defendants' stipulation 
to the intervention of other parties and due to the trial court's post-judgment ruling that it 
did, in fact have subject matter jurisdiction at all relevant times. 
Appellants fail to show the trial court erred in denying Appellants' rule 60(b )( 6) 
motion. Rulings on a motion under rule 60(b )( 6) are reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard of review, a showing Defendants fail to make. The trial court 
provided three independent bases for its decision regarding rule 7 4 and the effect of 
James' Notice of Withdrawal. Defendants respond to only one of these bases, and even 
then with a response that is insufficient to show abuse of discretion. 
Third, Defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
their motion for relief under rule 60(b)(l) on the basis of"excusable neglect." Defendants 
again fail to make the required showing. Defendants merely restate their unsupported 
version of the facts and conclude with an assertion that the trial court "abused its 
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discretion." This is insufficient to overturn the broad discretion afforded a trial court 
under rule 60(b ), particularly where, as here, the trial court examined all of the facts and 
from that examination determined Defendants failed to exercise the due diligence 
required to show excusable neglect. 
Finally, as argued in Mrs. Fields' Motion for Summary Disposition, this appeal is 
moot. The property at the heart of this case was sold long ago to a good-faith purchaser 
for the highest and best price available. Defendants not only failed to appeal from the 
Sale Order at issue, but failed to even attempt to stay proceedings at any point thereafter. 
Simply too much time and too many events have passed for this transaction to be undone, 
making this appeal moot. 
In any event, because Appellants have failed to show any error in the trial court's 
ruling, that ruling should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Rule 60(b) Standard 
Review of a trial court's rule 60(b) order "is limited in scope because such an 
appeal must only address the propriety of the denial or grant of reliet not the correctness 
of the underlying judgment." Weber v. Mikarose, LLC, 2015 UT App 130, ,i 11,351 P. 3d 
121. 
[E]ven when an order on a Rule 60(b) motion is appealable, the 
appeal is narrow in scope. An appeal of a Rule 60(b) order addresses only 
the propriety of the denial or grant of relief. The appeal does not, at least in 
most cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief 
was sought. Appellate review of Rule 60(b) orders must be narrowed in this 
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manner lest Rule 60(b) become a substitute for timely appeals. An inquiry 
into the merits of the underlying judgment or order must be the subject of a 
direct appeal from that judgment or order. 
Franklin Covey Client Sales v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ,r 19, 2 P. 3d 451 (quoting 12 
James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice§ 60.68(3] (3d ed.1999). 
This limited scope of review applies equally to a motion under rule 60(b )( 4 ). See, 
e.g., Migliore v. Livingston Fin., LLC, 2015 UT 9, ,r 26,347 P.3d 394 ("we narrowly 
construe the concept of a void judgment"); Wendt v. Leonard, 431 F .3d 410 ( 4th Cir. 
2005) (same). 
II. Defendants Fail to Show Any Error Regarding the Trial Court's Denial 
of Defendants' Rule 60(b)(4) Motion. 
Defendants moved the trial court to void the Sale Order based entirely on the mere 
filing of the Notice of Dismissal. The trial court denied this motion on three independent 
bases: 
1. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction was specifically 
addressed and resolved at the hearing on December 3, 2014 and Defendants 
failed to appeal. 
2. The Notice of Dismissal did not divest the Court of subject 
matter jurisdiction given the status of the proceedings and the stipulated 
entry of other parties. 
3. Even assuming that the Notice of Dismissal implicates subject 
matter jurisdiction, the court had subject matter jurisdiction and Defendants 
consented and waived any right to object to the Court proceeding 
notwithstanding the Notice of Dismissal. 
See Ruling and Order, pp. 6-8. 
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Any one of these bases is sufficient to sustain the trial court's ruling. 
a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Was Previously Raised and Determined. 
Defendants' rule 60(b )( 4) motion sought relief from a judgment Defendants 
argued was void due to the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. This argument cannot 
succeed because the issue was raised and decided, and Defendants failed to appeal this 
decision. Now that the issue is final, it is not subject to further attack pursuant to a rule 
60(b) motion. 
Every court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. See US. v. Hahn, 
359 F.3d 1315, 1334 (10th Cir. 2004). 1 That decision, once made, "is resjudicata in a 
collateral attack." Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371,377 (1940); 
see also Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n. 9 
(1982) ("It has long been the rule that principles of res judicata apply to jurisdictional 
determinations-both subject matter and personal."); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey, 557 
U.S. 137, 152 (2009) ("[e]ven subject-matter jurisdiction ... may not be attacked 
collaterally") ( citation omitted); Sbkc Serv. Corp. v. 1111 Prospect, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
20471 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 1998) (same) (Add. Ex.I). 
Res judicata also applies to bar a post-appeal challenge in the same proceeding 
pursuant to rule 60(b )( 4 ). See Sbkc Serv. Corp., id. at ** 5-12; see also Hunter v. 
1 The Utah Supreme Court "recognizes the persuasiveness of federal interpretations when state 
and federal rules are similar and few Utah cases deal with the rule in question." Barton v. Utah 
Transit Authority, 872 P.2d 1036, 1039 n.5 (Utah 1994). 
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Underwood, 362 F.3d 468,475 (8th Cir.2004) ("Where a party has failed to appeal an 
adverse judgment, [a] Rule 60(b )( 4) motion will not succeed merely because the same 
argument would have been successful on direct appeal."); KBR, Inc. v. Chevedden, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97905 (S.D. Tex. July 12, 2013) (Add. Ex. 2), and cases cited therein 
(holding that rule 60(b)(4) motion was improper collateral attack on subject matter 
jurisdiction); Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Cartwright Transfer & Storage, Inc., 1992 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 14538, *4-5 (10th Cir. June 16, 1992); Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 64-65 
(2d Cir. 1986) (because appellees did not move to remand or challenge district court's exercise 
of jurisdiction on appeal, "they are now barred by principles of res judicata and the interest in 
finality of judgments from mounting a [Rule 60(b )( 4)] collateral attack on a prior judgment in 
the present action."); Honne'US v. Donovan, 691 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1982) (federal court's 
erroneous assumption of diversity jurisdiction does not render judgment void under Rule 
60(b)(4)). 
Here, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and the effect of a rule 41 voluntary 
dismissal on such jurisdiction was squarely before the trial court. Immediately after the 
TAB's Notice of Dismissal was filed, Intervenors each filed objections thereto. 
Defendants filed a response to these objections with arguments similar to those 
subsequently raised in their rule 60(b )( 4) motion. The matter was heard by the Court on 
December 3. At that hearing, the parties and the court agreed that the voluntary 
dismissal as to all parties was improper, that the case would and could proceed, that the 
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intervenors were substituted as plaintiffs, and that the receivership would continue. 
TAB' s counsel stipulated to the same, agreeing that the dismissal of TAB alone was 
appropriate, with the remaining parties and their claim against Defendants to be decided. 
The trial court effectuated these decisions pursuant to the Amended Receivership Order 
and, twenty days later, entered the Sale Order, its final order in the underlying case. 
The Amended Receivership Order, by its terms, evidenced that the trial court and 
the parties were in agreement that the dismissal was ineffective and that the court did not 
lose subject matter jurisdiction. Even if there is no discrete finding as to this point, it 
does not matter, because the law provides that (absent any specific ruling to the contrary) 
the trial court is deemed to have ruled on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in favor 
thereof. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1938) ("Every court in rendering a 
judgment, tacitly, if not expressly, determines its jurisdiction over the parties and the 
subject matter."); Sbkc Serv. Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20471, *7; Bryan v. Peters (In re 
Bryan), 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 102474, * 16 (D. Colo. Aug. 5, 2015 (Add. Ex. 3). As described 
by the Utah Supreme Court: 
"The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or 
questions which were in issue and adjudicated in a former action is 
applicable to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the 
litigation. This application of the general rule extends to questions 
necessarily involved in an issue ... although no specific finding may have 
been made in reference to that matter, and although such matters were not 
directly referred to in the pleadings." 
Macris & Assoc., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ,i 40, 16 P.3d 1214 (quoting 46 Am. 
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Jur. 2d Judgments§ 545)). This applies whether the court itself decided the matter or it 
was agreed to by stipulation. See id., ,r 43. 
Aside from the res judicata effect of the Sale Order, there is the more general principal 
that the "concept of a void judgment is extremely limited." Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. 
Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624 F .2d 822, 825 n. 5 (8th Cir.1980). Only when the 
jurisdictional error is "' egregious' will courts treat the judgment as void." United States v. 
Tittjung, 235 F.3d 330,335 (7th Cir.2000); Gschwindv. CessnaAircraftCo.,232F.3d 1342, 
1346 (10th Cir. 2000). The reason for this is, like the principal of res judicata, the "interest 
of finality." VTA., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220,225 (10th Cir. 1979); Brimhall v. Mecham, 
494 P.2d 525, 526 (Utah 1972). 
Even if the trial court had erred when it determined that it had jurisdiction, rule 60(b )( 4) 
cannot be used to overturn this decision. See Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 232 F.3d at 1346. 
This is because only a "clear usurpation of power" can form the basis for such a motion, 
and "a court does not usurp its power when it erroneously exercises jurisdiction." Id. 
"Error in interpreting a statutory grant of jurisdiction" is simply "not equivalent to acting 
with total want of jurisdiction." Id. See also Wendt, 431 F.3d at 413 ("[W]hen deciding 
whether an order is void under Rule 60(b)(4) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, courts 
must look for the rare instance of a clear usurpation of power."); Hunter v. Underwood, 
362 F .3d at 4 7 5 ("A Rule 60(b X 4) motion to void the judgment for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction will succeed only if the absence of jurisdiction was so glaring as to constitute 
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a total want of jurisdiction or a plain usurpation of power so as to render the judgment 
void from its inception."); Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 624 F.2d 822, 825 (erroneous assumption 
of jurisdiction does not render judgment void under Rule 60(b)(4)). So long as there is even 
an "arguable basis" for jurisdiction (to which all parties below agreed), courts do not grant 
relief under rule 60(b )( 4 ). United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 264 
(2010). 
Defendants failed to appeal the trial court's jurisdictional ruling (instead 
stipulating thereto). Under the law set forth above, the failure to appeal is decisive as to 
the matter now before the Court; an objection to the trial court's decision via a rule 60(b) 
motion does not provide an avenue for relief in this case. Accordingly, the trial court's 
denial of that motion should be affirmed. 
b. The Notice of Dismissal Was Improper and Inszef.ficient to Dismiss this Case. 
Even if Defendants could somehow bypass the dispositive issue of finality, they 
cannot show that the trial court's ruling was otherwise erroneous. 
The trial court held that the Notice of Dismissal had no effect on its subject matter 
jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the trial court ruled that, given the entry of various 
orders, including a stipulated motion to intervene granting "intervention of right" and the 
appointment of a receiver, TAB did not have authority to dismiss the entire case without 
order of the Court. Defendants fail to show any error in this ruling. 
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Before TAB filed the Notice of Dismissal, the parties had already stipulated to the 
intervention of five other creditors. The Order Granting Motion to Intervene was entered 
more than three weeks prior to the filing of the Notice of Dismissal. The Order 
appointing a receiver was entered two weeks before the alleged dismissal. 
The plain language of Rule 41(a)(I) ("the plaintiff' may file a notice of voluntary 
dismissal), does not authorize one plaintiff acting alone to dismiss all claims of all parties. 
Defendants have cited no cases in which one plaintiff succeeded in automatically 
dismissing claims of other intervenors under Rule 41 (a)( I) without their consent. 
Instead, Defendants argue that the manner in which the parties intervened was improper 
under rule 24. This argument fails for two reasons. 
First, Defendants did not appeal from the trial court's order granting intervention. 
Accordingly, the issue of whether the trial court properly allowed for intervention is not 
before this Court. See Weber v. Mikarose, LLC, 2015 UT App 130, ,i 11; Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ,i,i 19, 23, 2 P.3d 451; see also Wendt v. 
Leonard, 431 F .3d at 412 ( courts "must be mindful that Rule 60(b )( 4) is not a substitute 
for a timely appeal."). 
Second, Defendants stipulated to the intervention and therefore waived any defect 
they now complain of. While a party may not be able to waive an appropriate challenge 
to subject matter jurisdiction, it can certainly waive the right to object to intervention. 
See In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, ,i 52, 137 P.3d 809 (holding that standing and the right to 
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intervene may be stipulated); see also Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603 
P.2d 793, 798 (Utah 1979) (stipulation waives rights otherwise available). 
Under rule 41, unless all parties consent to dismissal, voluntary dismissal as to 
those parties is improper. Where there are multiple plaintiffs, each one is deemed to 
have a separate and distinct cause of action and a voluntary dismissal by less than all 
plaintiffs can, at most, dismiss only the consenting plaintiffs' claims. See Miller v. 
Stewart, 43 F.R.D. 409, 412-13 (E.D. Ill. 1967); Wheeler v. American Home Prod. Corp., 
582 F.2d 891,896 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that Rule 4I(a)(l) does not authorize dismissal 
of the entire case by the original plaintiff where intervening plaintiffs did not consent); 
University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 178 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 
1999) (holding that attempted notice of voluntary dismissal under Rule 4I(a)(l) was 
ineffective where "it was by no means clear that the proper plaintiff' filed the notice). 
While Defendants argue that the intervenors were not properly labelled as 
"plaintiffs", this ignores the trial court's ruling that they were "parties for all purposes." 
As intervening creditors of the Defendants, they could only be deemed plaintiffs. This 
was verified by the Court in its Amended Receivership Order ("The intervening creditors 
in this case are substituted as plaintiffs under the Third Cause of Action") (R.780). 
TAB's Notice of Dismissal (even ignoring the fact that all parties subsequently agreed to 
the withdrawal of such notice) was therefore improper and ineffective to dismiss the 
entire case. See, e.g., Supernova Media, Inc. v. Pia Anderson Dorius Reynard & Moss, 
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2103 UT 7, ,r 54,297 P.3d 559 (intervention precludes voluntary dismissal under rule 
41(a)(2)). 
The second ruling made by the trial court in this regard related to the broad nature 
of subject matter jurisdiction: 
[T]here is no question that the Court had subject matter over this 
case when it was filed. Indeed, the alleged lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction is premised on _a technical or procedural irregularity, not the 
Court's general authority to decide cases within a class. Assuming without 
deciding that the Notice of Dismissal implicates subject matter jurisdiction, 
Defendants could consent to, or waive their right to object to, the Court 
proceeding notwithstanding the Notice of Dismissal. See [Johnson v. 
Johnson, 2010 UT 28] at ,r 11 ( citing with approval holding in Donovan v. 
Templeton, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2617 at *7 (Ohio Ct. App., May 9, 
1997) that technical or procedural irregularity is waived if not promptly 
raised). Based on their counsel's representations at the December 3rd 
hearing and his approval of the Order on December 3, 2014 Hearing, 
Defendants consented and waived any right to object to the Court 
proceeding notwithstanding the Notice of Dismissal. 
Ruling and Order, p. 7. 
Defendants attack this ruling on the basis of the general proposition that a party 
cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction. However, citation to this principal is 
insufficient to warrant reversal here. 
In Johnson v. Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court made clear that subject matter 
jurisdiction is simply "the authority of the court to decide the case," and that subject 
matter for a district court existed "in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the 
Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law." 2010 UT 28, ,r 8,234 P.3d 1100 (citing 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 38, 100 P.3d 1177); see also Utah Code Ann§ 
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78A-5-102(1) ("The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law."). Most cases 
that address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction "have considered the authority of the 
court to adjudicate a class of cases, rather than the specifics of an individual case." 2010 
UT 28, ,r 10. At issue in Johnson was a divorce case between parties who had not been 
married. Despite the existence of a statutory requirement of marriage before a court 
could issue a divorce decree, the Court held that, because the trial court could hear 
divorce cases generally, it had "subject matter" jurisdiction. 
A similar decision was rendered in Chen. There, defendants (like Defendants 
here) argued that, because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and could be 
raised at any time, the trial court erred when it ruled that Ms. Chen had waived her right 
to object to appointment of a special master. See Chen, 2004 UT 82, ,r,r 33-41. The 
Chen Court, like the Johnson Court, noted that the trial court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the predecessor statute to§ 78A-5-102(1). The 
Court also held that a party can waive an objection to the appointment of a special master, 
or a receiver, and that this did not relate to issues of subject matter jurisdiction, but 
equitable powers of the court. See id. and ,r 48. 
Here, Defendants do not (and cannot) argue that the trial court had no power to 
hear the underlying case. Indeed, TAB' s initial complaint in this case made clear that the 
court "has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 
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78A-5-102(1)." R 2, ,r 6. Because Defendants fail to show that the Notice of Dismissal 
somehow destroyed the trial court's general subject matter jurisdiction, and failed to show 
why the rulings in Johnson and Chen do not apply equally here, they fail to provide a 
basis to disturb the trial court's ruling. 
Because Defendants fail to provide a basis for overturning the three separate bases 
provided by the trial court, Defendants' appeal of the order denying their rule 60(b )( 4) 
motion must fail. 
III. Defendants Fail to Show Abuse of Discretion Regarding the Trial 
Court's Denial of Defendants' Rule 60(b)(6) Motion. 
Defendants argued below that, by virtue of the trial court's failure to require 
compliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 74, the Sale Order should be set aside pursuant to the 
"catchall" provision of rule 60(b)(6). (R. 1027). Rulings on a motion under rule 60(b)(6) 
are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review. Bodell Constr. Co. v. 
Robbins, 2014 UT App 203, ,r 5. Defendants fail to show an abuse of discretion. 
The trial court provided three separate bases for its decision regarding rule 74.2 
First, the trial court ruled that the Notice of Withdrawal was "defective, and therefore 
ineffective, because it did not include Defendants' address(es)." (R.1458.) "This is not a 
mere technicality because the address requirement is directly tied to the other parties' 
ability to comply with the notice to appear or appoint requirement and to communicate 
with Defendants during this critical period of time." Id. 
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In response, Defendants argue that failure to include one's client on a notice of 
withdrawal is a "technical deficiency," and that the trial court should have overlooked this 
deficiency. Defendants cite no authority to support this assertion. Instead, the argument 
appears to be that "the adverse parties" could and should have contacted Defendants, 
despite the fact that Defendants' own counsel was (without dispute) receiving notice of 
all relevant pleadings and hearings ( as James was still listed as counsel for Defendants on 
the court's electronic case management system), up until and including the final judgment 
entered in this case. App. Br., p. 33. This argument is without legal support and 
Defendants otherwise fail to show an abuse of discretion. 
Second, the trial court held that Defendants' counsel had notice of all pleadings 
and that Defendants had actual notice of the Sale Order no later than January 2015 
(R.1459). Because no action was taken despite such notice, the trial court held that 
Defendants "waived any rule 74 objection." Id. Defendants do not address, let alone 
dispute, this ruling or the issue of waiver, and therefore fail to show an abuse of 
discretion. In any event, waiver is expressly anticipated and allowed for in rule 74. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 74(c); Migliore v. Migliore, 2008 UT App 208, ,r 19, 186 P.3d 973. 
The trial court provided a third reason to support its refusal to set aside the Sale 
Order when it held that refusal to do so was "not inconsistent with substantial justice:" 
Defendants did not exercise sufficient diligence in connection with 
these proceedings and they received substantial benefits from the Asset 
2 In its Ruling and Order, the trial court lumped its review of this issue into its discussion about 
void judgments. However, the motion was made pursuant to rule 60(b)(6). 
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Purchase Agreement. As Defendants appear to concede given the limited 
relief they are requesting, the Court cannot undo the transaction. See Rule 
61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (no error or defect in any ruling or 
order or in anything done or omitted by the court is ground for disturbing a 
judgment or order unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice). 
(R.1455.) Once again, Defendants do not address this ruling, thereby failing to show an 
abuse of discretion. In any event, such a ruling is consistent with rule 74, which allows a 
court to proceed if it so chooses; going forward was "otherwise ordered by the court." 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 74(c); Sale Order at pp. 1-2, and 14 (holding that, despite the trial 
court's awareness of the withdrawal of counsel, there was sufficient notice under the 
"facts of this case"). 
Ultimately, it was not the trial court or the parties who failed to comply with rule 
74, but Defendants. The parties agree that Defendants' counsel failed to include any 
contact information for Defendants as required by rule 74(a). Defendants cannot 
complain of lack of notice when the information needed to give notice was absent from 
the required pleading. 
Further, there is no question that James, as counsel for the Defendants, received 
notice on and after December 18, 2014 of (i) the sale motion; (ii) the notice providing an 
opportunity to object to the sale, an opportunity to submit higher offers, and an 
opportunity to appear at the sale hearing; (iii) the proposed Sale Order, which included a 
fully executed copy of the APA with exhibits; and (iv) the Sale Order as entered by the 
Court on December 23, 2014. Defendants certainly knew, before James attempted to 
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withdraw, that the Amended Receiver Order had been entered (they stipulated to it) and 
that the assets of ICC and NG were about to be sold by the Receiver on a very short 
time line (R. 779-82). Nevertheless, Defendants chose not to actively participate in the 
case on and after December 18, 2014. These facts support the trial court's third ruling, 
and Defendants fail to show any abuse of discretion. 
Last, to the extent Defendants instead now seek to alter their argument to request 
a ruling that the trial court's decision regarding rule 74 is "void" under rule 60(b)(4), this 
specific argument was not raised below. In any event, Defendants cite no legal authority 
to support this argument and otherwise fail to show that the trial court's ruling regarding 
rule 7 4 was erroneous. 
IV. Defendants Fail to Show Abuse of Discretion Regarding the Trial 
Court's Denial of Defendants' Rule 60(b)(l) Motion. 
Defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied their 
motion for relief under rule 60(b)(l) on the basis of"excusable neglect." Once again, 
Defendants fail to make the required showing. Defendants merely restate their 
unsupported version of the facts and conclude with an assertion that the trial court 
"abused its discretion." This is insufficient to overturn the broad discretion afforded a 
trial court under rule 60(b ). 
"We grant broad discretion to trial court's rule 60(b) rulings because most are 
equitable in nature, saturated with facts, and call upon judges to apply fundamental 
principles of fairness that do not easily lend themselves to appellate review." Fisher v. 
{00277696.RTF /} 31 
Bybee, 2004 UT 92, ,r 7, 104 P.3d 1198 (citing Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 UT 
App 46, ,r,r 9-10, 68 P.3d 1008. Accordingly, "the outcome of rule 60(b) motions are 
rarely vulnerable to attack." Id. 
Here, the trial court went over the facts of the case in detail, providing a number of 
reasons why Defendants ultimately failed to show excusable neglect. "Excusable 
neglect" is defined under Utah law as "the exercise of due diligence by a reasonably 
prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini Spas v. Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 
130, 132 (Utah 1987). The trial court specifically determined that "Defendants have not 
shown that they exercised sufficient diligence .... " (R.1455.) The bases for this ruling 
included findings that: ( 1) during the relevant time period, Defendants knew a receiver 
had been appointed, that an offer had been made and that timing was an issue; (2) there 
was no evidence that Defendants did not have actual notice of all relevant proceedings; 
and (3) all of the relevant pleadings and notices were served on James. See id. 
Further, the trial court addressed Defendants' complaint (reasserted on appeal) 
regarding the timing of relevant hearings: 
Defendants' arguments that they had only 5 days to respond to the 
Expedited Motion and that Mr. Ryan could not have appeared on behalf of 
ICC and NG are likewise unpersuasive. While Mr. Ryan could not have 
represented ICC and NG at the hearing on December 23, 2014, there is 
nothing that prevented him from attending the hearing and alerting the Court 
to Defendants' concerns about the proposed sale to Mrs. Fields and/or the 
short time period for reviewing and responding to the Expedited Motion. It 
appears Defendants did not have any objection to the sale of the assets to 
Mrs. Fields until they were confronted with the release language during the 
Ohio litigation filed months later. This, along with Defendants' acceptance of 
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the beneficial aspects of the sale, does not support a finding that they acted in good 
faith. (R.1455-56.) 
Accordingly, the trial court's detennination that Defendants failed to show 
excusable neglect were reasonably supported by the facts of the case. This is sufficient 
to sustain the trial court's ruling under an abuse of discretion standard, and Defendants 
fail to show otherwise. 
V. This Appeal Should be Dismissed for Mootness. 
An appeal is moot "when an appellant has failed to obtain a stay of the 
judgment and the remedy sought is thereafter rendered impossible." Richards v. 
Baum, 914 P.2d 719, 721 (Utah 1996). Moreover, "an appeal will be dismissed as 
moot if an event happening after hearing and decree in circuit court, but before appeal is 
taken, or pending appeal, makes determination of the appeal unnecessary or renders it 
clearly impossible for the appellate court to grant effectual relief." Masonry Arts, Inc. v. 
Mobile Co. Com 'n, 628 So.2d 334, 335 (Ala. 1993) (quotations and citation omitted) 
( cited with approval in Baum, 914 P .2d at 721 ). See also Eighth District Electrical 
Pension Fund v. Westland Construction, Inc., 2013 UT App 273, i12, 316 P.3d 992 
("mootness can be determined by facts that change or develop as the suit is pending"). 
The Court should dismiss this appeal because the relief Defendants seek is not 
possible. Pennitting Defendants to "object" now to a good-faith sale completed in 2014 
would be a pointless and futile exercise, as there is no manner in which this Court can 
"undo" the critical aspects of the sale (i.e., payment of over two million dollars by Mrs. 
{00277696.RTF /} 33 
Fields, transfer of clear title to the assets to Mrs. Fields, distribution of the sale proceeds 
to secured creditors, and incorporation of the assets into Mrs. Fields' business operations 
for nearly a year and a half now). 
In the Sale Order, the trial court found and concluded, inter alia, that Mrs. Fields 
made the highest and best offer for the assets of ICC and NG, that the Receiver complied 
with all requirements of the receivership orders, that Mrs. Fields acted in good faith and 
at arm's length in negotiating the Purchase Agreement, and that the Purchase Agreement 
required the Receiver to sell the assets to Mrs. Fields free and clear of all 
"Encumbrances" (as broadly defined in the Purchase Agreement to include all liens, 
taxes, claims, charges, interests or encumbrances). See Sale Order , ,r,r 2, 4-6. 
Defendants have not challenged, and have no basis to challenge, these critical factual 
findings. 
The Sale Order also provided, inter alia: (i) that the Receiver was authorized to 
sell the assets free and clear of all encumbrances, (ii) that upon closing the assets would 
be "fully transferred to and vested in" Mrs. Fields, (iii) that Mrs. Fields "is afforded all 
protections available to good faith purchasers of Assets under applicable law and the 
Receivership Orders," (iv) that the transfer of assets from the Receiver to Mrs. Fields 
would be "legal, valid, and effective transfer" of the assets and Mrs. Fields would have 
"all right, title, and interest" in and to the assets, and (v) that the Receiver was 
"authorized to execute and deliver, and empowered fully to perform under, consummate, 
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and implement" the asset sale. See id., ,r,r 14-18. Again, Defendants do not and cannot 
challenge these findings. 
Rather than challenge any of the particular findings, conclusions or ordering 
provisions set forth above, Defendants argue they should have been allowed to object to 
one provision contained in the Purchase Agreement, to wit, the provision relating to 
release of claims. Defendants do not allege that the remaining terms of the Sale Order 
are unfair or should be set aside. However, in order to grant Defendants any possible 
relief in this appeal, the Court would have to undo the entire transaction authorized by the 
Sale Order. The Receiver would have to be reinstated, all funds would have to be 
returned to the Receiver, and all portions of the Purchase Agreement and the Sale Order 
would have to be rescinded. Defendants provide no authority, and none exists, that 
would entitle Defendants to have, or allow this Court to order, such a drastic form of 
relief-even if such relief were somehow possible. 
This is particularly true in this case, where Defendants did not appeal the Sale 
Order and failed to obtain a stay at any time to prevent effectuation of the Sale Order. 
Defendants' failure to seek and obtain a stay at any point along the way renders the appeal 
moot. 
In Baum, the appellants sought specific performance of a real estate contract and a 
decree quieting title to the property. "Because of their failure to obtain a stay pending this 
appeal, the property was lawfully sold to another." Id. at 722. Given the sale of the 
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property, the Utah Supreme Court held that "[n]o action which we could now take would 
affect the litigants' rights to the property." Id. 
The Baum court relied in part upon Kellch v. Westland Minerals Corp., 484 
P .2d 726 (Utah 1971 ), where stockholders brought an action to require a corporation 
to issue certain stock. The trial court granted the relief sought, and the corporation 
appealed. The corporation failed to stay the operation of the judgment or to supply a 
bond. The stockholders then sold and transferred the stock to third parties. The Kellch 
court held that it was "without power to grant any relief to the [corporation] and upon 
remand the court below would be equally powerless," and dismissed the appeal as 
moot. Kellch, 484 P .2d at 726. 
Accordingly, once the property at issue in the underlying lawsuit has been sold, 
appellate courts will not decide the merits of the appeal. See Baum, 914 P .2d at 721; see 
also Capri Sunshine v. E & C Fox Investments, 2015 UT App 231, ,r 9 n.2 ("this court 
cannot stop the sale after it has occurred"); BV Lending v. Jordanelle Special Service 
District, 2015 UT App 117 (holding that foreclosure sale renders appeal moot). "Any 
other result would nullify the requirement that the appellant obtain a stay pending 
appeal." Baum, 914 P .2d at 721. 
In Masonry Arts, an appeal related to the refusal of a trial court to enjoin the award 
of a public contract. The order was not stayed on appeal, and the eventual grant of the 
contract rendered the appeal moot. See 628 So.2d at 335. Similarly, in Westinghouse 
{00277696.RTF /} 36 
Elec. v. Grand River Dam Auth., 720 P.2d 713 (Okla. 1986), another case cited favorably 
in Baum, a party sought to have an appeal court prevent the awarding of a contract that 
had already been substantially completed. The court would not do so: 
This Court cannot prevent what has already taken place, and we 
cannot envision any order we might issue which would grant [appellant] the 
relief it seeks this late in the proceedings. If the action sought to be 
enjoined has been performed and no particular relief can be afforded, the 
issues in this Court are abstract and hypothetical and the case becomes 
moot. 
Id. at 718. 
The refusal to undo a transaction applies with particular force in the context of a 
receivership sale of assets. For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed 
an equitable receivership case where the assets of a company were sold by a 
court-appointed receiver pursuant to a final court order. See United States v. Alder Creek 
Water Co., 823 F.2d 343,345 (9th Cir. 1987). The company and its owner sought to set 
aside the receivership sale and a return of the company's assets to the owner. Id. The 
court held that the owner "lacked standing to seek redress for the corporation's injuries" 
and that the company's challenges "to the validity of the receivership, sale of the assets, 
and disbursement of funds are moot." Id. at 345. The court explained that "[a] case 
becomes moot when interim relief or events have deprived the court of the ability to 
redress the party's injuries." Id. The failure of the company and its owner to obtain a stay 
of the sale order pennitted irreversible changes to occur, including consummation of the 
sale, distribution of sale proceeds, and numerous expenses, costs and obligations incurred 
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by the buyer in reliance upon the sale order. Id. The Court concluded: "There is no 
reasonable way to undo the sales transaction and its many consequences at this time. 
These equitable considerations prevent us from examining the defendants' challenges to 
the validity of the receivership, sale of the assets, or subsequent disbursement of funds." 
Id.; see also Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, ,r,r 9, 8-11, 18-19 (upholding a 
sale of assets that had occurred in a bankruptcy case against a collateral attack made in 
state court).3 
The same reasoning should apply here. Even if Defendants could show any of 
them had standing at this late date to assert an objection to the Receiver's motion, there is 
"no reasonable way to undo" the transaction approved by the Receiver and authorized by 
the trial court. The Companies' assets have been sold and their creditors paid. 
Defendants' objection to one provision contained in the Purchase Agreement, if 
sustained, would mean the entire transaction would need to be unraveled. Whether this 
situation is viewed through the lens of legal or equitable remedies, the effect is the same -
the matter is moot. Had Defendants obtained a stay of the Sale Order, effectuating a 
remedy might have been possible. But Defendants failed to do so. In the meantime, 
Mrs. Fields has been running the candy manufacturing business it purchased pursuant to 
3 In Maero v. Bunker, 2009 UT App 300, 221 P.3d 860, this Court applied a similar bankruptcy statute 
mandating that an order approving a bankruptcy sale is valid unless "stayed pending appeal," even if it is 
reversed. Id. at ,i 4 (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 363). The policy behind that ruling applies with particular 
force here: "[T]his rule is in furtherance of the policy of not only affording finality to the judgment of 
the bankruptcy court, but particularly to give finality to those orders and judgments upon which third 
parties rely." Id. 
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the Purchase Agreement for all the time that has passed since the Sale Order was entered. 
See, e.g., Receiver's Mem. in Supp. of Expedited Motion, p.3 (describing the business 
purchased pursuant to the Purchase Agreement). Each day that has passed makes it all 
the more difficult to "undo" the effects of the Sale Order, particularly when Defendants 
knew of the sale and could have sought a stay. 
Because there is no effective relief this Court can or should provide, this appeal 
should be dismissed as moot. 
Conclusion 
Defendants fail to meet their burden on appeal and are unable to show any 
reversible error committed by the trial court. Had Defendants been able to show such an 
error, there is no meaningful relief this Court can provide. Accordingly, Mrs. Fields 
respectfully requests that this Court either affinn the trial court's Ruling and Order or 
dismiss this appeal for mootness. 
DATED this 
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Case Summary 
Procedural Posture 
Plaintiff creditor filed a motion to vacate the court's prior 
judgment in the creditor's action against defendants, 
debtor and associated individuals, to recover 
post-foreclosure deficiencies. 
Overview 
The creditor filed an action in state court against 
defendants to recover post-foreclosure deficiencies. 
Defendants removed the action to the court. The 
creditor's challenge to the removal was based solely on 
a forum selection clause in an underlying contract. The 
court granted the creditor's motion to remand, but that 
order was reversed on appeal. The court later entered 
judgment in favor of defendants. The appellate court 
affirmed in substance the court's order. The creditor 
later filed a motion to vacate the court's judgment as 
void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court 
denied the motion. The court held that the creditor could 
not challenge the court's jurisdiction through a motion to 
vacate under Fed. R. Civ. P 60(b)(4) because it neither 
appealed the court's prior implicit determination that the 
court had subject matter jurisdiction nor filed a motion to 
remand the action to state court for lack of diversity 
between the parties. The court also held that the court's 
prior judgment was not subject to collateral attack 
because the court's exercise of jurisdiction was not so 
flagrant that the court usurped its power. 
Outcome 
The court denied the creditor's motion to vacate the 
court's prior judgment in the creditor's action against 
defendants to recover post-foreclosure deficiencies. 
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General Overview 
Civil Procedure > Judgments > Relief From Judgments > 
Void Judgments 
HN1 Fed. R. Civ. P 60(b)(4) states in part that on motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve 
a party or a party's legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reason: 
the judgment is void. In the interest of finality, the 
concept of setting aside a judgment on voidness 
grounds is narrowly restricted. For a judgment to be 
void under Fed. R. Civ. P 60(b)(4), it must be determined 
that the rendering court was powerless to enter it, 
plainly usurped its power, or acted in a manner 
inconsistent with due process of law. Moreover, if a 
judgment is void, relief is not a discretionary matter; it is 
mandatory. 
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Jurisdiction > General Overview 
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Civil Procedure > Judgments > Preclusion of Judgments > 
General Overview 
Civil Procedure> Judgments> Preclusion of Judgments> 
Res Judicata 
HN2 A federal district court's erroneous exercise of 
subject matter jurisdiction is not subject to collateral 
attack in a subsequent proceeding. A party that has had 
an opportunity to litigate the question of subject matter 
jurisdiction may not reopen that question in a collateral 
attack upon an adverse judgment. Even if a court does 
not expressly rule on matters relating to its exercise of 
jurisdiction, if the parties could have challenged the 
court's jurisdiction and failed to do so, res judicata 
principles bar them from collaterally attacking 
jurisdiction. Every court in rendering a judgment tacitly, 
if not expressly, determines its jurisdiction over the 
parties and the subject matter. A judgment rendered by 
a federal district court bars a subsequent action even 
where the record shows that the parties were not diverse 
and, thus, that the court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
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HN4 Since a court has power to determine its own 
jurisdiction and, in fact, is required to exercise that 
power sua sponte, it does not plainly usurp jurisdiction 
when it merely commits an error in the exercise of that 
power. 
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Opinion 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
This matter is presently before the court on plaintiff 
SBKC Service Corporation's motion to vacate judgment 
and dismiss [*2] action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction (doc.# 78). For the reasons set forth below, 
plaintiff's motion is denied. 
Procedural History 
On November 1, 1995, plaintiff SBKC Service 
Corporation filed this action in Kansas state court 
against defendants 1111 Prospect Partners, L. P., 
William Jeffery Ill and Kristin Jeffery alleging that 
defendant 1111 owed plaintiff nearly one million dollars 
in post-foreclosure deficiencies and that the Jefferys 
were liable for the alleged deficiency. 
On December 7, 1995, defendants removed this case 
to this court, alleging subject matter jurisdiction based 
on diversity of citizenship. Specifically, defendants 
asserted "upon information and belief' that plaintiff 
SBKC Service Corporation was a Kansas citizen and 
that defendants were California citizens. Plaintiff SBKC 
Service Corporation did not challenge defendants' 
asserted jurisdictional facts; rather, plaintiff challenged 
the removal based solely on a forum selection clause in 
an underlying contract which permitted the action to be 
brought in Kansas state court. Although this court 
granted plaintiffs motion to remand based on the forum 
selection clause, the Tenth Circuit reversed [*3] the 
ruling. See SBKC Se[Yjl;e Corp. \f. 1111 Prospect P?d::. 
ners_,__LP. 105F3d 578,._582-8:3_{1.Qth Cir. 1997). 
Plaintiff and defendants subsequently moved for 
summary judgment or for dismissal of the action. On 
May 28, 1997, this court issued an order granting the 
Jefferys' motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction; granting defendant 1111 's motion for 
summary judgment; and denying plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment. On May 29, 1997, this court entered 
judgment in favor of defendants. After plaintiff appealed 
the judgment, 1 the Tenth Circuit affirmed, in substance, 
this court's order. See SBKC Sen;. CQ.£.Q._Y,,_ 1111 Pros...: 
pect Partners. LP. 1998 US. Ap..Q. LEXIS 17522, No. 
97-3193, 1998 WL 436579 (10th Cir. July 30, 1998). 2 
Plaintiff did not seek further review of the Tenth Circuit's 
decision. 
[*4] On May 29, 1998, defendant Kristin Jeffery filed an 
action in California state court against plaintiff SBKC 
Service Corporation and its lawyers alleging that they 
maliciously and without probable cause filed the Kansas 
deficiency action against her. On July 2, 1998, SBKC 
Service Corporation removed the case to federal court 
in California claiming subject matter jurisdiction based 
on diversity of citizenship (i.e., Mrs. Jeffery was a 
California citizen and SBKC Service Corporation was a 
Kansas citizen). Mrs. Jeffery moved to remand the case 
to California state court, claiming that diversity of 
citizenship did not exist in that SBKC Service 
Corporation was a dual citizen of both Kansas and 
California. The California District Court, concluding that 
SBKC Service Corporation's last principal place of 
business was California, granted Mrs. Jeffery's motion 
and remanded the case to California state court. 
SBKC Service Corporation now seeks to vacate this 
court's judgment as void under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(4) because, according to SBKC, this 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction with respect to 
the deficiency action (i.e., because diversity of 
citizenship did not [*5] exist between the parties). As set 
forth in more detail below, even assuming the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action, the 
prior judgment is not void within the meaning of Rule 
60(b)(4). Thus, plaintiffs motion is denied. 
Applicable Standards 
In light of the dearth of case law construing Rule 60(b )( 4) 
motions in this district and the Tenth Circuit, it is useful 
to first consider the language and purpose of the rule. 
HN1 Rule 60(b)(4) states in relevant part: "On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve 
a party or a party's legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
... (4) the judgment is void; .... " In the interest of 
finality, "the concept of setting aside a judgment on 
1 Plaintiff did not appeal this court's implicit determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 
2 In light of its holding that plaintiffs claims against Mr. Jeffery were barred for the same substantive defects applicable to 
plaintiffs claims against defendant 1111, the Tenth Circuit vacated as moot this court's dismissal of plaintiffs claims against Mr. 
Jeffery based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal as to Mrs. Jeffery and so this Court's 
dismissal of the claim against her was affirmed. 
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voidness grounds is narrowly restricted." VT.A.. Inc .• v. 
Airco. Inc .• 597 F.2d 220. 225 (10th Cir. 1979). For a 
judgment to be void under Rule 60{b)(4), it must be 
determined that the rendering court was powerless to 
enter it, plainly usurped its power, or acted in a manner 
inconsistent with due process of law. Id. at 224-25. 
Moreover, if a judgment is void, relief is not a 
discretionary matter; it is mandatory. rs] Wilmer v. 
Board of County Comm'rs, 69 F.3d 406. 409 (10th Cir. 
1995) (citations omitted); Orner v. Shala/a, 30 F.3d 
1307. 1310 {10th Cir. 1994) (quoting VT.A., 597 F.2d at 
224 n.8). 3 
Discussion 
The Supreme Court has long held that HN2 a federal 
district court's erroneous exercise of subject matter 
jurisdiction is not subject to collateral attack in a 
subsequent proceeding. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. v. 
Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694. 702 n.9. 72 L. 
Ed. 2d 492. 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982) ("A party that has 
had an opportunity to litigate the [*7] question of subject 
matter jurisdiction may not, however, reopen that 
question in a collateral attack upon an adverse 
judgment.") (citing Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Bax-
ter State Bank. 308 U.S. 371, 84 L. Ed. 329. 60 S. Ct. 
317 (1940); Stat/ v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165. 83 L. Ed. 
104. 59 S. Ct. 134 (1938)). Even if a court does not 
expressly rule on matters relating to its exercise of 
jurisdiction, if the parties could have challenged the 
court's jurisdiction and failed to do so, res judicata 
principles bar them from collaterally attacking 
jurisdiction. Chicot County. 308 U.S. at 378; see Stoll, 
305 U.S. at 171-72 ("Every court in rendering a judgment 
tacitly, if not expressly, determines its jurisdiction over 
the parties and the subject matter."). With respect to the 
facts presented here, the Supreme Court has held that 
a judgment rendered by a federal district court bars a 
subsequent action even where the record shows that 
the parties were not diverse and, thus, that the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Des Moines Naviga-
tion & R.R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co .• 123 U.S. 552, 
558-59. 31 L. Ed. 202. 8 S. Ct. 217 (1887). See generally 
18 Charles Alan [*8] Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward 
H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure§ 4428 (1981 ). 
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether a 
judgment rendered by a federal district court precludes 
a party from challenging the district court's jurisdiction in 
the same proceeding pursuant to a Rule 60(b) motion. 
Several circuit courts, however, including the Tenth 
Circuit, have extended the principles of Chicot County 
and Des Moines Navigation to the Rule 60(b)(4) context. 
See, e.g., Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Cartwright Trans-
fer & Storage. Inc .. 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14538, No. 
91-5008, 1992 WL 138487, *4-5 (10th Cir. June 16, 
1992); Picco v. Global Marine Drilling Co .• 900 F.2d 846. 
850 (5th Cir. 1990) (party barred from challenging district 
court's jurisdiction in a Rule 60(b)(4) proceeding where 
party had a "full and fair, unimpeded opportunity" to 
challenge court's jurisdiction by appeal); Nemaizer v. 
Baker. 793 F.2d 58. 64-65 (2d Cir. 1986) (because 
appellees did not move to remand or challenge district 
court's exercise of jurisdiction on appeal, "they are now 
barred by principles of res judicata and the interest in 
finality of judgments from mounting a [Rule 60(b)(4)] 
collateral attack [*9] on a prior judgment in the present 
action."); Honneus v. Donovan, 691 F.2d 1. 2-3 {1st Cir. 
1982) (federal court's erroneous assumption of diversity 
jurisdiction does not render judgment void under Rule 
60(b)(4)); Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes 
Carbon Corp .• 624 F.2d 822. 825 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(erroneous assumption of jurisdiction does not render 
judgment void under Rule 60(b)(4)); Pacurar v. Hernlv. 
611 F.2d 179. 180-81 (7th Cir. 1979) (HN3 if record 
showed an absence of jurisdiction but no jurisdictional 
objection by the parties, the judgment could not be set 
aside as void under Rule 60(b)(4)). 
In Missouri Pacific Railroad, 4 the lower court entered 
judgment in a quiet title action concerning a railroad 
crossing. 1992 WL 138487 at *1. Several months after 
the court entered judgment, the defendants filed a Rule 
60(b)(4) motion requesting the court to vacate its 
judgment as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
on the ground that the Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission had exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
whether a railroad crossing was public or private. Id. 
The lower court concluded that jurisdiction was proper 
and denied the defendants' motion r101 to vacate. Id. at 
3 The court also notes that Rule 60(b}(4) motions are not subject to any time limitations. Wilmer. 69 F.3d at 409; Orner. 30 
F.3d at 1310 (citing V. T.A.. 597 F.2d 220 at 224 & n.9; Venable v. Haislip. 721 F.2d 297. 299-300 (10th Cir. 1983)}. As the Tenth 
Circuit has recognized, a void judgment "is a nullity from the outset and any 60(b )(4) motion for relief is therefore filed within a 
reasonable time." V. T.A.. 597 F.2d at 224 n.9. 
4 The court recognizes that the citation of unpublished decisions by the Tenth Circuit remains unfavored. Nonetheless, the 
court finds the opinion in Missouri Pacific Railroad has persuasive value on the issue raised by plaintiffs motion and, thus, is 
. relevant to the court's analysis. 
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*2. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit observed that the 
defendants' failure to appeal directly the lower court's 
implicit findings that it had subject matter jurisdiction 
was fatal even if the district court's finding was 
erroneous. Id. at *4. According to the Circuit, defendants 
could have challenged the district court's exercise of 
jurisdiction on direct appeal. Because they failed to do 
so, "they are now barred by principles of res judicata 
and the interest in finality of judgments from mounting a 
collateral attack on a prior judgment in the present 
action." Id. See also V. T.A.. Inc. v. Airco. Inc., 597 F2d 
220, 225-26 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating, in dicta, that 
60(b )(4) motion is a collateral attack). The Court further 
explained: 
Contrary case law and commentators' views 
permitting any collateral attack on a prior judgment 
under Rule 60{b)(4) always involve a clear 
usurpation of power by a district court, and not an 
error of law in determining whether it has jurisdiction. 
HN4 Since a court has power to determine its own 
jurisdiction and, in fact, is required to exercise that 
power sua sponte, it does not plainly usurp 
jurisdiction when it merely commits r11J an error in 
the exercise of that power. 
Id. (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker. 793 F2d 58, 64-65 (2d 
Cir. 1986)). See also Disher v. Information Resources. 
Inc .• 873 F.2d 136, 140 (7th Cir. 1989) (HN5 "[A) court 
without jurisdiction can render a binding judgment on 
the merits if the judgment is allowed to become final, 
unless the lack of jurisdiction is so gross that the 
judgment is deemed void."}. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that "in the final analysis, whether the lower 
court had jurisdiction or not, it clearly did not 'usurp' 
jurisdiction" and thus, did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Rule 60{b)(4) relief for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Id. at *5. Cf. Depex Reina 9 Partnership v. 
Texas Int'/ Petroleum Corp .. 897 F.2d 461. 464 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (res judicata did not preclude defendant from 
raising lack of subject matter jurisdiction for first time at 
district court on remand from Tenth Circuit where case 
was still pending and final judgment had not been 
entered}. 
r12J Here, as in Missouri Pacific Railroad. plaintiff 
SBKC did not appeal directly this court's implicit 
determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the parties. Moreover, SBKC did not move to remand 
the action to state court for lack of diversity between the 
parties. See Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F2d 58. 64-65 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (party who could have moved to remand 
action to state court or challenged court's jurisdiction on 
direct appeal barred "from mounting a collateral attack 
on a prior judgment in the present action"}, quoted in 
.Missouri Pacific Railroad. 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 
15438. 1992 WL 138487 at *4. Finally, it cannot be said 
that the court's exercise of jurisdiction here was so 
gross that the court usurped its power, rendering the 
judgment void. Thus. even assuming this court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the action, the judgment 
entered by the court is not subject to collateral attack 
through a 60(b )(4) motion. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion 
must be denied. See Honneus v. Donovan, 691 F2d 1. 
2-3 (1st Cir. 1982) (HN6 federal court's erroneous 
assumption of diversity jurisdiction does not render 
judgment void under Rule 60(b)(4)). 
IT 15 THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT r13J 
THAT plaintiff's motion to vacate judgment and dismiss 
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (doc.# 78) is 
denied. 
IT 15 50 ORDERED. 
Dated this 30th day of October, 1998, at Kansas City, 
Kansas. 
John W. Lungstrum 
United States District Judge 
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Opinion 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
This court granted summary judgment for KBR and 
against John R. Chevedden, and entered final judgment 
in April 2011. The Fifth Circuit affirmed that decision in 
June 2012 and issued its mandate. KBR v. Chevedden. 
478 F. App'x 213 (5th Cir. 2012}. In January 2013, 
Chevedden moved to have the judgment vacated under 
Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Chevedden based his motion on Already. LLC v. Nike, 
Inc., U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 721. 184 L. Ed. 2d 553 S. 
Ct. 721 (2013). He later moved for leave to file a 
supplemental brief to discuss another recently issued 
Supreme Court decision, Clapper v. Amnesty Int'/ USA. 
U.S. • 133 S. Ct. 1138. 185 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2013!. 
(Docket Entry Nos. 49, 52). KBR opposed the motion to 
set aside the judgment. (Docket Entry No. 50). 
Based on the record; the motions, response, and reply; 
and the applicable law. this court finds that Rule 60(b)(4) 
does not provide a basis for the relief Chevedden 
seeks. His motion to set aside the judgment is denied. 
[*2] Because this court does not need to, and does not, 
decide whether the analysis or outcome would have 
changed if the recent Supreme Court case law had 
been in effect before the judgment became final, the 
motion for leave to file supplemental authority is also 
denied. Finally, KBR's motion for sanctions is denied. 
The reasons for these rulings are explained below. 
I. Background 
KBR sued Chevedden for a declaratory judgment that it 
could exclude his proposal from its 2011 proxy materials. 
Chevedden moved to dismiss on several grounds, 
including that KBR lacked standing to sue him. On 
March 9, 2011, this court held that "KBR has met its 
burden to show standing," and "may exclude 
Chevedden's proposal from its 2011 proxy materials." 
(Docket Entry No. 17 at 18). On March 14, 2011, 
Chevedden filed an amended motion to dismiss and 
included a statement that "he will not sue [KBR] if it 
elects to exclude his proposal from its proxy materials 
and his decision not to sue is irrevocable." (Docket 
Entry No. 18). KBR opposed Chevedden's motion and 
moved for summary judgment. In ruling on these 
motions, and Chevedden's subsequent motion for 
reconsideration, this court rejected Chevedden's 
arguments that [*3) KBR lacked standing and that his 
statement made KBR's suit against him moot. This 
court applied the relevant law, including Medlmmune. 
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc .. 549 U.S. 118. 137, 127 S. Ct. 
764. 166 L. Ed. 2d 604 (2007), which held that a patent 
licensee could seek a declaration that the patent was 
invalid without first exposing itself to an infringement 
suit by withholding payments due under its licensing 
agreement with the patent holder. Under these cases, 
Chevedden's statement did not eliminate the 
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controversy because he had not withdrawn his proposal 
and continued to demonstrate a willingness to enforce 
his rights. 
Chevedden appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed this 
court's grant of KBR's summary judgment motion. KBR 
v. Chevedden. 478 F App'x 213 (5th Cir. 2012). On 
appeal, Chevedden argued, as he did before this court 
and does again now, that "the dispute lacks sufficient 
immediacy and reality to be a justiciable dispute under 
the Declaratory Judgment Act." Id. at 214. The Fifth 
Circuit rejected Chevedden's argument and explained 
that because his proposal required KBR to choose 
between spending a significant sum to revise its proxy 
statement or excluding Chevedden's proposal and 
exposing itself to potential litigation, r4J there was a 
justiciable dispute between the parties. Id. at 215. 
Chevedden also argued, as he did before this court and 
does now, that "any possibility of litigation stemming 
from a decision to exclude his proposal is vitiated by his 
stipulation that he would not sue if KBR chose that 
course." Id. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, 
noting that Chevedden "continued to refuse to withdraw 
his proposal." Id. at 214-15. The Fifth Circuit explained 
that excluding Chevedden's proposal would continue to 
"implicate KBR's duties to all of its shareholders" and 
"could expose KBR to an SEC enforcement action." Id. 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed eight months before 
Chevedden filed this motion to set aside the final 
judgment, denied the petition for rehearing, and issued 
its mandate. Chevedden ended his direct appeals at 
that point. 
Chevedden now argues that two recent Supreme Court 
cases on standing and mootness, Already and Clapper, 
provide a basis for collateral relief under Rule 60(b). 
II. Analysis 
Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
states that a court may relieve a party from a final 
judgment if it is "void." FED. R. C1v. P 60(b)(4). Voidness 
may be based on lack of subject rs] matter jurisdiction, 
if the "rendering court was powerless to enter the 
judgment, plainly usurped its power, or acted in a 
manner inconsistent with due process of law." V. TA.. 
Inc. v. Airco. Inc .• 597 F2d 220. 224-25 (10th Cir. 1979); 
see also Carter v. Fenner. 136 F 3d 1000. 1006 (5th Cir 
1998) (stating that "[a] judgment is void only if the court 
that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, 
or of the parties, or it acted in a manner inconsistent 
with due process of law." (quotation marks, brackets, 
and citation omitted)). Courts agree that, "[i]n the interest 
of finality, the concept of setting aside a judgment on 
voidness grounds is narrowly restricted," V. TA.. 597 
F2d at 225, because of the tension between validity 
and finality in judgments. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS§ 12 cmt. a (1982); see also In re Ziebarth, 51 F.3d 
1044. 1995 WL 153207. at *2 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[l]n the 
sound interest of finality, the concept of void judgment 
must be narrowly restricted." (citation, brackets, and 
quotation marks omitted)). 
The tension between finality and voidness is reflected in 
the rule that when the asserted defect that makes the 
judgment "void" is a lack of subject matter 
[*6] jurisdiction, Rule 60(b)(4) cannot be used for a 
collateral challenge when the court's exercise of 
jurisdiction was an error of law in determining whether it 
had jurisdiction, as opposed to a clear usurpation of 
power by that court. See Picco v. Global Marine Drilling 
Co .• 900 F.2d 846. 850 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a 
party is "barred from challenging the district court's 
jurisdiction in a Rule 60(b)(4) proceeding" if "the 
challenging party was before the court when the order 
in question was entered and had notice of it and had a 
full and fair, unimpeded opportunity to challenge it, and 
the court's jurisdiction, by appeal."); see also Wendt v. 
Leonard. 431 F3d 410. 413 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[W]hen 
deciding whether an order is void under Rule 60(b)(4) 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, courts must look 
for the rare instance of a clear usurpation of power." 
(quotation marks and citations omitted)); Hunter v. Un-
derwood. 362 F3d 468. 475 (8th Cir. 2004) ("A Rule 
60(b)(4) motion to void the judgment for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction will succeed only if the absence of 
jurisdiction was so glaring as to constitute a total want of 
jurisdiction or a plain usurpation of power so (*7] as to 
render the judgment void from its inception." (quotation 
marks and citations omitted)); United States v. Titt;ung. 
235 F3d 330. 335 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Rule 
60(b)(4) is not available to challenge collaterally a district 
court's jurisdictional error unless the error is 
"egregious"); Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co .• 232 F3d 
1342. 1346 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that for a 
judgment to be void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 
under Rule 60(b)(4) "[t]here must be no arguable basis 
on which [the court] could have rested a finding that it 
had jurisdiction." (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
Chevedden did not file a direct attack on the judgment 
after the Fifth Circuit affirmed it. The judgment became 
final, and the case was closed. The final judgment and 
the expiration of the time for seeking rehearing or 
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certiorari made subsequent attacks on subject matter 
jurisdiction collateral. Such a collateral attack cannot be 
made under Rule 60(b)(4) when, as here, the asserted 
flaw is that the court erred in deciding that it had subject 
matter jurisdiction, an error established not by the case 
law in effect when this court and the appellate court 
ruled, but decided rs] months later. The fact that 
Chevedden's argument is based on later-issued 
decisions makes it even more clear that this court and 
the appellate court did not "usurp power to act," but, at 
most, erroneously applied the law as clarified by 
subsequent authority. 1 
There is no need to address whether, had the Supreme 
Court issued its recent decisions on standing and 
mootness before the judgment in this case had become 
final instead of months later, the trial and appellate court 
rulings on jurisdiction might have been different. KBR 
has explained why, in its view, Nike does not change the 
outcome. Because Chevedden is barred from raising 
the challenge collaterally, there is no need to address 
KBR's arguments or allow the parties to brief in more 
detail any effect that Clapper might have had on the 
jurisdictional analysis. 
KBR seeks sanctions for [*10) Chevedden's allegedly 
frivolous Rule 60(b)(4) motion. Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure "prohibits filings made with 
'any improper purpose,' the offering of 'frivolous' 
arguments, and the assertion of factual allegations 
without 'evidentiary support' or the 'likely' prospect of 
such support." Young v. City of Providence ex rel Na-
politano. 404 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing FED. R. 
CIV. P. 11(b)(1)). The rule requires that a motion for 
sanctions "be made separately from any other motion" 
and be served on the opposing party 21 days before it is 
filed with the court. FED. R. C,v. P. 11(c)(2). There is no 
indication that KBR served its request for sanctions on 
Chevedden 21 days before filing. KBR's motion for 
sanctions under Rule 11 is denied. 
Ill. Conclusion 
Chevedden's motion to set aside the judgment is denied. 
His motion for leave to file a supplemental brief is 
denied as moot. KBR's motion for sanctions under Rule 
11 is denied. 
SIGNED on July 12, 2013, at Houston, Texas. 
/s/ Lee H. Rosenthal 
Lee H. Rosenthal 
United States District Judge 
1 The issue is not, as Chevedden states, framed in terms of "law of the case." Rather, the issue is presented in terms of finality 
and preclusion. See 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcncEAND PRocrnuRE § 4478 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 
2005) ("After final judgment, direct relief from the judgment is governed by the rules governing direct and collateral 
attack-principally found in Civil Rule 60(b} and habeas corpus and the procedure to vacate a criminal sentence-rather than 
law of the case .... "); see also Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n. 9, 102 S. Ct. 
2099, 72 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1982) ("It has long been the rule that principles of res judicata apply to jurisdictional determinations-both 
subject matter and personal."}. A "court has the authority to pass upon its own jurisdiction and its decree sustaining jurisdiction 
against attack, while open to direct review, is res judicata in a collateral attack." [*9] Chicot Cntv. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State 
Bank, 308 U.S. 371,377, 60 S. Ct. 317, 84 L. Ed. 329 (1940); see also Bostwick v. Baldwin Drainage District. 133 F.2d 1, 4 (5th 
Cir. 1943 l ("[S]tanding as a complete barrier to appellants' attack upon the judgment as void is the express determination and 
adjudication by the court that it had jurisdiction"). "[A] Court's determination that it has jurisdiction of the subject matter is binding 
on that issue, if the jurisdictional question actually was litigated and decided, or if a party had an opportunity to contest 
subject-matter jurisdiction and failed to do so." 11 WRIGHT & MILLER§ 2862. 
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Opinion 
ORDER AFFIRMING BANKRUPTCY COURT'S 
DECISION 
Janel K. Bryan and Brad Hunt (together, "Defendants") 
appeal the Bankruptcy Court's refusal to reopen an 
adversary proceeding in which the Bankruptcy Court 
previously awarded judgment to Chapter 7 Trustee M. 
Stephen Peters ("Peters"). For the reasons stated 
below, the Bankruptcy Court's decision is affirmed. 
I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Bankruptcy Court Proceedings 
In 2005, Gary Lee Bryan filed for bankruptcy protection. 
See In re Bryan, Case No. 05-38302-SBB (Bankr. D. 
Colo.). In 2008, Peters filed an adversary proceeding 
against Gary Bryan, Janel Bryan (apparently Gary's 
wife), Brad Hunt (trustee of [*2] the Bryan Family Trust), 
Vectra Bank Colorado, and Auto Source, LLC. (Record 
on Appeal ("R.") (ECF No. 8), Vol. 1 at 7-8.)1 Through 
various causes of action, Peters sought to invalidate the 
Bryan Family Trust and claw back trust property that 
allegedly belonged to the bankruptcy estate. (Id. at 
12-21.) Vectra Bank and Auto Source eventually settled 
(id. at 209-11 ), leaving only the individual defendants 
(collectively, "Adversary Proceeding Defendants"). 
Following pretrial motion practice, the adversary 
proceeding went to trial primarily on the question of 
1 Page citations to the Record on Appeal are to the consecutive pagination inserted in the bottom-right comer of each page. All other 
ECF page citations are to the page number in the ECF header, which does not always match the page number inserted by the filer's word 
processing program. 
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whether the Bryan Family Trust was enforceable. (Id. at 
142-56.) The Bankruptcy Court found as a matter of 
Colorado law that the trust was unenforceable. (Id. at 
143-46.) In light of this finding, the Bankruptcy Court 
entered judgment in favor of Peters on June 4, 2009, 
granting him possession of certain trust property. (Id. at 
162-63.) 
B. District Court Appeal 
The Adversary Proceeding Defendants appealed to this 
Court. r3J (Id. at 165-67.) On September 30, 2010, the 
Court (per the Hon. Walker D. Miller) issued its decision. 
(Id. at 212-30.) Applying the "clearly erroneous" 
standard of review, this Court upheld the Bankruptcy 
Court's conclusion that the Bryan Family Trust is invalid. 
(Id. at 227.) This Court also reversed as to certain other 
issues that do not appear to have continuing relevance. 
(Id. at 227-30.) The Adversary Proceeding Defendants 
then appealed to the Tenth Circuit. (Id. at 233.) 
C. Stern v. Marshall and the Tenth Circuit Appeal 
On June 23, 2011-while the Tenth Circuit appeal was 
pending-the Supreme Court decided Stem v. Mar-
shall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011). The 
Court in Stem held thatArticle Ill of the U.S. Constitution 
prevents a Bankruptcy Court from entering final 
judgment on a state common law counterclaim that is 
not resolved as part of ruling on a creditor's proof of 
claim. Id. at 2614-15. The parties never raised Stem 
before the Tenth Circuit. On August 23, 2012- over a 
year after Stem-the Tenth Circuit issued an order and 
judgment affirming this Court's decision in all respects. 
In re Bryan. 495 F. App'x 884 (10th Cir. 2012). 
D. Subsequent Bankruptcy Court Proceedings 
On March 4, 2014, Defendants (i.e., the Adversary 
Proceeding Defendants minus Gary Bryan) filed a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) motion with the 
Bankruptcy Court,2 claiming that the June 4, 2009 
judgment was void in light of Stern. (R., r4J Vol. 1 at 
248-51.) The Bankruptcy Court responded the next day 
with a "Notice of Nonjurisdiction," stating that it did not 
have jurisdiction to consider Defendants' motion 
because the case was closed. (Id. at 252.) 
On March 28, 2014, Defendants filed a Motion to 
Re-Open Case ("Motion to Reopen"). (Id. at 254-56.) 
Defendants requested reopening "to facilitate 
consideration" of the issues raised in their Rule 60(b)(4) 
motion. (Id. at 254.) The Bankruptcy Court held a 
hearing and then issued an oral ruling denying the 
Motion to Re-Open. (R., Vol. 2 at 27-32.) 
The Bankruptcy Court characterized the Motion to 
Re-Open as "presumably [brought] under ~ection 
350(b) of the Bankruptcy Code3 and/or Rule 60(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 9024 of 
the Bankruptcy Rules, although Movant, at least in his 
submissions failed to cite authority or foundation for its 
motion or this procedure." (Id. at 27.) Without specifying 
which of those two legal bases under which it was 
analyzing the Motion to Re-Open, the Bankruptcy Court 
explained that it was denying the motion for six reasons: 
1. failure to serve the motion on certain parties to 
the adversary proceeding;4 
2. "[l]ack of statutory or jurisdictional ground in 
supporting the motion to reopen"; 
3. Defendants' failure "to timely raise the 
jurisdictional question"; 
4. "no cause shown," rsJ because the "underlying 
reasons" lack merit; 
5. Stern "is not central and controlling" to the 
previous judgment; and 
6. "there are no new issues in this case" justifying 
reopening. 
(Id. at 28-29.) Defendants have appealed that ruling to 
this Court. (R., Vol. 1 at 280-93.) 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
2 Rule 60(bJ(4J applies in Bankruptcy Court per Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024. 
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) ("A case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed to administer assets, to accord 
relief to the debtor, or for other cause."). 
4 Given this Court's disposition below, it need not analyze this particular reason for denying the Motion to Re-Open. The 
Bankruptcy Court here refers to Defendants' failure to serve their Motion on Gary Bryan, Vectra Bank, and Auto Source. In 
appellate briefing, Defendants argue that serving the motion on Gary Bryan and Auto Source would have been a pointless 
exercise since Defendants' counsel is also Gary Bryan's and Auto Source's counsel-of-record. (ECF No. 11 at 25-26 & n.3.)As 
for Vectra Bank, Defendants say it has never participated in the case in any way since settlement. (Id. at 26.) 
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The standard of review in this instance turns on what 
sort of motion the Bankruptcy Court denied. Here, the 
Bankruptcy Court expressed uncertainty about whether 
Defendants were moving [*6] under Rule 60(b)(4) or J1 
U.S.C._§3f&L'2J. A Rule 60(b){4) denial is reviewed de 
novo. Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,232 F3d 1342J 
Ll45J_10th Cir. 2000/.Adenial under 11 U.S.C~l2Qi.P.) 
is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. In re Afp;:tx 
Co(Ilputer_QQCQ .. 71_F:JsL)53. 356 (10th Cir. J99.fil. 
The Court is not familiar with the underlying action's 
entire docket, but the docket entries included in the 
Record on Appeal do not show the uncertainty the 
Bankruptcy Court perceived. Defendants explicitly 
moved under Rule 60(b)(4), but the Bankruptcy Court 
instead required them to move to reopen the case. (R., 
Vol. 1 at 248-52.) Defendants' subsequent Motion to 
Re-Open did not cite any legal authority for reopening, 
but the Bankruptcy Court understood that 1_1 USG.§ 
350(Ql governs that question. Moreover, Defendants' 
Motion to Re-Open was specifically intended to permit 
the Bankruptcy Court to consider Defendants' Rule 
60(b)(4) arguments on the merits. (Id. at 254; see also 
R., Vol. 2 at 13 (Defendants' counsel at oral argument 
referring to Defendants' Rule 60(b)(4) motion as 
"incorporated" into the Motion to ReOpen).) 
This Court need not resolve the procedural complexities 
raised by this course of proceedings. In particular, this 
Court need not resolve whether a party to a bankruptcy 
proceeding wishing to bring a Rule 60(b)(4) motion 
must first successfully petition the Bankruptcy Court to 
reopen the case under 11 U.S.C. § 350{b).5 Even if the 
Bankruptcy Court had granted [*7] the Motion to 
Re-Open, it would then have needed to reach the Rule 
60(b)(4) question directly, and it is the Rule 60(b)(4) 
question that occupies most of the parties' briefs on 
appeal. Moreover, one of the Bankruptcy Court's 
reasons for denying relief was that the "underlying 
reasons" for the Motion to Re-Open lacked merit. (R., 
Vol. 2 at 29.) Although ambiguous, this seems to be a 
reference to the availability of Rule 60(b)(4) relief. 
The Court will therefore review the Bankruptcy Court's 
order as if the Bankruptcy Court directly denied Rule 
60(b)(4) relief. As noted, such a ruling receives de nova 
review. Gschwind0 _232 F3d at_1345. In addition, this 
Court may affirm the Bankruptcy Court for any reason 
supported by the record. United States v. M_yers (In re 
M.J@.L$}, 362 f3d 667. 674 n.Zi1_QJlLCir. 2QQ1J.. 
Ill. ANALYSIS 
A. Rule 60(b)(4) Challenges to Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction, Generally 
Defendants argue that Stern prevents the Bankruptcy 
Court from entering final judgment based on a finding 
that the Bryan Family Trust is invalid as a matter of 
Colorado law.6 (ECF No. 11 at 18-19.) Defendants [*8] 
"candidly acknowledge that considerable time has 
passed since trial in 2009," and that "[n]o one believed 
that Article Ill jurisdiction was an issue at that time," but 
claim that they still have a right to challenge the 
Bankruptcy Court's subject matter jurisdiction. (Id. at 
20-22.) Peters, of course, opposes this position. (ECF 
No. 21 at 14-22.) 
The parties' respective arguments reveal a slight tension 
in the case law surrounding challenges to subject matter 
jurisdiction. On the one hand, it is commonly said that 
"[c]hallenges to subject-matter jurisdiction can of course 
be raised at any time prior to final judgment." _Grupo 
Dataf/ux v. Atlas Global G(J2. L.P 541 U.S. 567. 571, 
-1.2.1 S. Ct. 1920. 158 L. Ed. 2d 866 (200.1) (emphasis 
added); see also Buggieri v. Gen. Well Serv. Inc., 535 
F Sup])~ 529 n. 2 J~Colo. 1982) ("If ... a final 
judgment is entered, then later challenges to 
subject-matter jurisdiction may be barred.").7 On the 
other hand, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) 
specifically permits a post-judgment attack on "void" 
judgments-and among the reasons that a judgment 
may be void is that "the court that rendered it lacked 
jurisdiction [ over] the subject matter." 11 Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2862 (3d 
ed., Apr. 2015 [*9] update) (" Wright & Miller"). Moreover, 
5 Nonetheless, such a requirement would raise concerns. It could allow a Bankruptcy Court to resolve the §_;J;i.Q(Q} question 
through a ruling that is, in effect, a Rule 60(b)(4) denial, but which receives only abuse-of-discretion review rather than the de 
novo review typically due to Rule 60(b)(4J rulings. 
6 Given the disposition below, this Court need not address whether Stern would indeed prohibit a final judgment such as that 
entered by the Bankruptcy Court in this case. 
7 In this context, "final judgment" can refer literally to a final, unappealed judgment, and also to a judgment affirmed on appeal 
with no possibility of further review. See, e.g., Travelers lndem. Co. v. Baii@Y._557 U S. 137_, 14~ 129 S. Ci 2195 17 4 L E_d 
2d \lli..(_200fil ("the 1986 Orders became final on direct review over two decades ago"). 
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the Tenth Circuit has long held that Rule 60(b)(4) 
motions are not subject to any time limit. See Unitg_q 
States v. Buck._ 281 F3d 1336,.)344 (10th Cir. 2002); 
Gschwind,_232 F3d at. 1345-46; Orner v. Shala/a. 30 
F3d_ 1307. 1310JJ0th_Cir. 19W; V. TA .. )nc. v. Airco. 
lnc.,597 F2d 220._224_(10th Cir. 1979J; accord 11 
Wright & Miller § 2862 ("there is no time limit on an 
attack on a judgment as void"). Thus, one line of case 
law appears to cut off subject matter jurisdiction 
challenges after final judgment, while Rule 60(b)(4) 
permits subject matter jurisdiction challenges at any 
time. 
The Court believes these two positions may be 
reconciled by acknowledging that a court may not deny 
a Rule 60(b)(4) motion simply due to the time elapsed 
since final judgment. Nonetheless, as numerous 
decisions demonstrate, the fact of a final judgment still 
matters a great deal in any Rule 60(b)(4) analysis. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Chicot CounJ . '>LDrain-
qg_e District v. Baxter State B9nk. 308 U.S. 37{. 60 S. 
<;;.L:JJ 7, 84 L. Ed. 329 (194Q), illustrates this point well. 
In Chicot, the plaintiff sought to recover on certain 
bonds that had previously been canceled by a federal 
district court exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction. fs/.'---aj 
372-73 376. The plaintiff sought to avoid the 
cancellation [*10) decree by arguing that the Supreme 
Court later declared the statute authorizing the bond 
cancellation unconstitutional, and the decree was 
therefore "void." Id. _at 374-75. The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, holding that the decree was res 
judicata despite its basis on a 
later-found-unconstitutional statute. Id. at 378. 
The Supreme Court began by noting that the plaintiff 
"had full opportunity to present any objections to the 
[prior] proceeding ... [including] as to the validity of the 
statute under which the proceeding was brought." ld,_ill 
;}_]_!i. But, 
Id. 
[a]pparently no question of validity was raised and 
the cause proceeded to decree on the assumption 
by all parties and the court itself that the statute was 
valid .... If the general principles governing the 
defense of res judicata are applicable, these 
[plaintiffs], having the opportunity to raise the 
question of invalidity, were not the less bound by 
the decree because they failed to raise it. 
The Court next addressed the plaintiffs argument "that 
the District Court was sitting as a court of bankruptcy, 
with the limited jurisdiction conferred by statute, and 
that, as the statute was later declared to be invalid, the 
District Court was without jurisdiction to [*11) entertain 
the proceeding and hence its decree is open to collateral 
attack." Id. at 376. The Court found this argument 
"untenable" because "[t}he lower federal courts are all 
courts of limited jurisdiction, that is, with only the 
jurisdiction which Congress has prescribed." Id. They 
nonetheless have authority "to determine whether or 
not they have jurisdiction to entertain the cause and for 
this purpose to construe and apply the statute under 
which they are asked to act. Their determinations of 
such questions, while open to direct review, may not be 
assailed collaterally." Id. 
Subsequent decisions have tempered Chicofs "may 
not be assailed collaterally" language, but not by much. 
For example, the Travelers case, supra, involved certain 
bankruptcy court orders entered in 1986, arguably in 
excess of bankruptcy jurisdiction. 557_U.S. at 141-47. 
Almost twenty years later, the Second Circuit held (in a 
separate action) that those 1986 orders indeed 
exceeded a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction at the time. 
Id. at 147. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that 
"once the 1986 Orders became final on direct review 
(whether or not proper exercises of bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction and power), they became res judicata." ld0 
at.152. 
The Court [*12) acknowledged, however, that "[t]he rule 
is not absolute, and we have recognized rare situations 
in which subject-matter jurisdiction is subject to collateral 
attack." Ldc at 151_n.6. The Court cited two of its own 
decisions, one allowing collateral attack when sovereign 
immunity was at stake, and the other allowing collateral 
attack to a state-court foreclosure judgment entered in 
violation of a bankruptcy statute. Id. The Court also 
quoted the Restatement (Second) of Judgments' 
position, which permits collateral attacks on subject 
matter jurisdiction where: 
( 1) The subject matter of the action was so plainly 
beyond the court's jurisdiction that its entertaining 
the action was a manifest abuse of authority; or 
(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would 
substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal 
or agency of government; or 
(3) The judgment was rendered by a court lacking 
capability to make an adequately informed 
determination of a question concerning its own 
jurisdiction and as a matter of procedural fairness 
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the party seeking to avoid the judgment should 
have opportunity belatedly to attack the court's 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
Id. (quoting B..estfJ_f£HIJ(l.[1t (Sec;_gnd) 0U1H/..Qments § L2 
(1980)). The Court found "no occasion to address [*13) 
whether we adopt all of these exceptions" because the 
parties argued none and the Court could not see how 
any would apply: "This is not a situation, for example, in 
which a bankruptcy court decided to conduct a criminal 
trial, or to resolve a custody dispute, matters 'so plainly 
beyond the court's jurisdiction' that a different result 
might be called for." Id. 
The Tenth Circuit thoroughly addressed this "plainly 
beyond the court's jurisdiction" standard in its Gschwind 
decision, supra. The plaintiff in Gschwind was a Belgian 
citizen who brought a wrongful death action in Ohio 
state court against a Kansas citizen, an Ohio citizen, 
and a Canadian citizen. 232 F3d at 1344. The 
defendants then removed to the Southern District of 
Ohio. Id. The plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that the 
Ohio defendant defeated removal jurisdiction, but the 
Southern District of Ohio determined that the Ohio 
defendant had been fraudulently joined and therefore 
denied the motion to remand. Id. The case was then 
transferred to the District of Kansas and conditionally 
dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. Id. 
The plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit and lost. Id. 
She "then petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en 
bane, [*14] arguing for the first time that the district court 
lacked diversity jurisdiction over suits between aliens 
[i.e., herself and the Canadian citizen]." Id. The Tenth 
Circuit denied the petition, and the Supreme Court 
subsequently denied the plaintiff's petition for certiorari. 
Id. The plaintiff then filed for Rule 60(b)(4) relief in the 
district court, again arguing lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction over suits between aliens. Id. The district 
court denied the motion. Id. at)345. 
On appeal from that denial, the Tenth Circuit 
acknowledged that certain authorities supported the 
plaintiff's jurisdictional argument, but the court 
nonetheless affirmed the district court's denial of Rule 
60(b)(4) relief. ld._at _1345. The Tenth Circuit noted that 
a judgment is "void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
... only where there is a plain usurpation of power, 
when a court wrongfully extends its jurisdiction beyond 
the scope of its authority." Id. at 1346 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, 
[a] court does not usurp its power when it 
erroneously exercises jurisdiction. Since federal 
courts have jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, 
that is, power to interpret the language of the 
jurisdictional instrument and its application [*15) to 
an issue by the court, error in interpreting a statutory 
grant of jurisdiction is not equivalent to acting with 
total want of jurisdiction. There must be no arguable 
basis on which the court could have rested a finding 
that it had jurisdiction. 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; 
alterations incorporated). Under those standards, the 
Tenth Circuit held that the district court's allegedly 
erroneous interpretation of a jurisdictional statute 
[did] not render the underlying judgment void. 
Moreover, there was at least an arguable basis for 
jurisdiction because the scope of the district court's 
jurisdiction over a case with foreign parties on both 
sides of an action is far from clear from the face of 
the [relevant] statute. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
B. Defendants' Rule 60(b)(4) Challenge 
In light of Gschwind, Defendants here must show a 
"plain usurpation of power," i.e., "no arguable basis on 
which the [Bankruptcy Court] could have rested a finding 
that it had jurisdiction," and not simply an "error in 
interpreting a statutory grant of jurisdiction." Id. 
Defendants offer only two arguments in this regard: (1) 
the Bankruptcy Court did not make a jurisdictional 
determination that they could [*16] have challenged 
earlier; and (2) the Bankruptcy Court's entry of final 
judgment was indeed a "plain usurpation of power." 
(ECF No. 11 at 27-28; ECF No. 24 at 15-16.) The Court 
will examine each argument in turn. 
1. No Previous Jurisdictional Determination 
Defendants argue that the Bankruptcy Court previously 
determined only its statutory jurisdiction, not its Article 
Ill jurisdiction, and so "this issue remains open for 
determination at this time." (ECF No. 11 at 28.) 
Defendants are incorrect. The Supreme Court held 
many years ago that "[e]very court in rendering a 
judgment tacitly, if not expressly, determines its 
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter." 
Stoll v. GQttlieb, :}05 U.S. 165. 171-72. 59 S, Ct. 1.:J.::L . .!33 
L. Ed. 104_{19381. 
Moreover, "[a] party that has had an opportunity to 
litigate the question of subject-matter jurisdiction may 
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not ... reopen that question in a collateral attack upon 
an adverse judgment." Ins Corp. of Ireland v._COIJ1129SJ::. 
nie des Bauxitesde Guinee. 456 U._S. 694. 716 n.9. 102 
S. Ct._2099...,_ 72 L. _Ed. 2d 492J_1982) (emphasis added). 
Defendants certainly had an opportunity, and it is no 
excuse that "[n]o one believed that Article Ill jurisdiction 
was an issue at that time." (ECF No. 11 at 18.) The 
Chicot case, discussed supra, likewise involved a 
jurisdictional issue that no one thought to challenge at 
the time: "no question of validity was raised and the 
[*17] cause proceeded to decree on the assumption by 
all parties and the court itself that the 
uurisdiction-granting] statute was valid." :)OE3_U.S._flt 
3.]Ji. (emphasis added). The judgment remained res 
judicata despite the parties' and the lower court's 
apparent unawareness that a jurisdictional problem 
might exist Id. at 376. Thus, Defendants may not obtain 
Rule 60(b)(4) relief by arguing that the precise 
jurisdictional question at issue was never previously 
addressed. 
2. Plain Usurpation of Power 
Defendants also argue that the Bankruptcy Court plainly 
usurped jurisdictional power when it entered its June 
2009 judgment. (ECF No. 24 at 15-16.) Defendants 
make this argument for the first time, however, in their 
reply brief-as the very last argument in their reply brief, 
no less. (Id.) Defendants seem to frame this as a 
response to Peters's invocation of the Gschwind 
standard (see ECF No. 21 at 20), but the Gschwind 
standard is Defendants' burden to satisfy. la..re Stone. 
588 F2d 1316. 131911f)JhJ:;JL 1978) ("Rule 60(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits relief from a 
final judgment only if the movant can demonstrate 
justifiable grounds .... " (emphasis added)). It is not 
something that Defendants could ignore until raised by 
an opposing party. Accordingly, any argument in this 
regard raised for the first time [*18] in a reply brief is 
waived. See Colo. Rail Passenger Ass'n v. Fed. Transit 
{ldmJn,_,_ 843 F SJJPJL2Ii__1J.J;5-Q.,_11_Z11D. Colo. 2011J.. 
Even if not waived, the Court would reject the argument 
on its merits. Defendants' entire argument is as follows: 
In this case, Stern v. Marshall disposes of any 
argument that the Bankruptcy Court possessed 
even an arguable basis for exercising subject matter 
jurisdiction. In Stern, the Supreme Court held that 
an entire category of claims-consisting of all claims 
under state law seeking to augment or enlarge the 
bankruptcy estate-lie outside the jurisdiction of 
the bankruptcy courts. The Bankruptcy Court in this 
case exercised jurisdiction over just such a claim 
and ruled on it. The Bankruptcy Court did not merely 
make a minor error in the application of its 
jurisdiction; rather, it intruded upon a wide swath of 
claims which are constitutionally limited to Article Ill 
courts. 
(ECF No. 24 at 15-16 (boldface removed).) This is not 
an argument about "arguable basis," but a reiteration of 
Stern's holding. To the extent Defendants mean to say 
that Stern's holding was a foregone conclusion, 
Defendants forget that Stem was a 5-to-4 decision. See 
Stem. 131.S. Ct. at 2621 (dissenting opinion). This 
Court is unwilling to hold that there was no arguable 
basis in 2009 for a position embraced [*19] by four 
Supreme Court justices in 2011. 
Further, Defendants have not pointed this Court to a 
single case in which a final judgment was collaterally 
voided on account of Stern. Instead, Defendants cite 
cases in which lack of jurisdiction was established on 
direct appeal. See In re BP RE L.P. 735 F3d 279 281 
(5th Cir. 2013); Wellness Int'/ Network. Ltd. v. Sharif 
727 F3d 751. 755 {7th Cir. 2013), rev'd in part, 135 S. 
Ct. 1932. 191 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2015); Waldman v. Stone. 
698 F3d 910 917-18 (6th Cir. 2012). (See also ECF No. 
11 at 21-22.) As already noted, direct appeal differs 
substantially from collateral attack. As the Supreme 
Court explained many years ago: 
It is just as important that there should be a place to 
end as that there should be a place to begin 
litigation. After a party has had his day in court, with 
opportunity to present his evidence and his view of 
the law, a collateral attack upon the decision as to 
jurisdiction there rendered merely retries the issue 
previously determined. 
Stoll. 305 U.S. at 172. Thus, "[t]he past cannot always 
be erased by a new judicial declaration." ChicoL 308 
U. S~at 37 !l. Defendants have failed to establish that 
this case presents one of those very rare situations 
where the past can be erased by a new judicial 
declaration. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the 
Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED. 
Dated this 5th day of August, 2015. 
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BY THE COURT: United States District Judge 
/s/ William J. Mart nez 
William J. Martnez r20J 
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